owadays the Internet is playing a very important role in different domains. During previous years a lot of research 1,2,3 was done for trying to develop applications, which make it possible to supervise and control industrial processes over the Internet. Internet-based control can be described as the whole of operations performed to control or monitor a system in the Internet environment. An Internet-based control system allows the process data to be retrieved by a controller, operator, and engineer at a remote location. Control action issued in the remote location can be executed in a local process. The difference from a normal remote control system and/or distributed control system is that the communication media is the Internet rather than any other private media. The public Internet possesses security risk by its open environment nature. Remote operation extends the scope of the Internet -based control system safety from plant sites to the whole Internet community because there are some degrees of possibility that the local control system is falsified by outsiders through the Internet. The features of the public Internet must be considered in the design of Internet-based control systems in order to prevent them from attacks by outside hackers. Existing technologies such as plant firewall, user authentication, communication path encryption, access log and format conversion 4 might be able to make Internet-based control systems safer but never be able to stop the attacks from 'cyber terrorists'. Therefore systematic safety and security checking in the design of Internetbased control systems is essential in order to reduce the loss caused by the attacks and will provide guidelines for the operators to efficiently respond to the attacks. This paper will systematically consider the safety and security issues through the design phase and clarify all the scenarios of cyber terrorist attacks. Actions to respond the attacks will be suggested as the results of the safety and security analysis. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 identifies the safety and security problems in Internet-based control systems. Section 3 describes all the possible targets for attack by malicious hackers. Section 4 introduces a hybrid data encryption algorithm for real-time data transfer. Section 5 presents a safety risk analysis procedure based on the principles of process plant HAZOP (HAZard and OPerability). Section 6 gives a case study to illustrate the design of an Internet-based control system and the procedures of safety and security checking. Section 7 provides the conclusions.
Similarity of safety and security
Safety risk analysis has the aim of specifying the safety requirements of the system. The security risk analysis identifies the potential security problems. There are some differences but more similarities between safety and security properties 5 . For example, in security the weaknesses in a system and dangers are called vulnerabilities and threats; in safety they are called failure mechanisms and hazards, but they can be considered to be alike. In security examples the countermeasures that need to be put in place to counter the risks are access controls, fire walls, etc, in safety they are redundancy, protective equipments, monitoring devices, etc. Rushby 6 presented the nature of safety and security, in which the differences between the two were recognised, but also both groups subscribe to similar development techniques, i.e. safety and security techniques could be applicable to each other's domains. Security could benefit from fault-tolerant approaches typically found in safety techniques, and security system developers might benefit from a greater understanding of the hazard analysis methods used by safety engineers.
In general, safety, security and their associated risk analysis techniques are closely related. Both deal with risks and both result in constraints, which may be regarded as negative requirements. Both involve protective measures, and both produce requirements that are considered to be of the greatest importance. These similarities indicate that some of the techniques applicable to one field could also be applicable to the other.
In Internet-based control systems the safety problems are caused by the authorised users because of the nature of the remote operation. Avoiding the failures caused by the authorised users can be achieved through safety analysis at the Internet level. The security problems are caused by the cyber terrorists' attacks. Preventing attackers from accessing the Internet-based control systems are assured by network security measures such as fire wall and data encryption.
Security risks from malicious hackers
The Internet router is obviously the first target of attack if any malicious hacker tries to gain unauthorised access into a local control system 7 . Figure 1 Feature a fatal accident (node E5) through intruding into the Intranet (node A2), intruding into the control system (node B2), altering control parameters (node C3), and causing abnormal process conditions (node D4). In Figure 1 intrusion takes time from left to right and increases the degree of risk from bottom to top. Cutting off the path at any point, which starts at the node A1 and ends at the node E5, will prevent a fatal accident from happening. In fact, Figure 1 gives four possible points at which the path from A1 to E5 might be cut:
N Cutting the path between the nodes A2 and B2 by detecting and shutting out the intrusion into the Intranet (nodes A3 and A4). This way has a minimum risk to the process. N Cutting the path between nodes B2 and C3 by detecting the intrusion into the local control system (node B3), cutting off the link with the external network (node B4), and allowing the control system to run isolated from the network. N Cutting the path between nodes C3 and D4 by using the safeguard to protect the process from an unexpected change in control parameters. N Cutting the path between nodes D4 and E5 by activating the safety interlock system (SIS) to trigger the normal shutdown procedure. This is the last protection before causing a fatal accident and has a maximal loss to the process.
Data encryption
According to the security risk analysis given above, the control system protection is composed of three layers. The first layer is the standard firewall protection, which uses password control to allow authorised users to enter the control system. The second layer relies on encoding and decoding mechanisms to protect the data exchange between the local control system and the remote control system. The third layer is based on the inherent system safe design such as the safety interlock system (SIS). All three layers should be put in place before the control system is open to the public. Only the data encryption is discussed here. A hybrid data encryption algorithm has been developed in our previous research 8 , in which the Advanced Encryption Standard 9 (AES) and the most popular publickey cryptography RSA 10 (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) are combined in order to meet both the real-time and security requirements simultaneously.
AES is the next-generation defence against malicious persons tampering with confidential data. The AES algorithm only involves simple matrix operations and has a high rate of encryption/decryption. Therefore the AES satisfies the real-time requirement. Because of the simplicity of the algorithm all the steps in the AES algorithm can be easily reversed if the AES cipher is available. In contrast, the RSA algorithm is a commonly used public-key cipher algorithm. Because the RSA algorithm uses a public key to encrypt a file and uses a private key to decrypt it, it is safer than the AES, but it has a slow rate of encryption/decryption and is not suitable for real-time data transfer. The hybrid algorithm used in our Internet-based control systems adopts the RSA algorithm to encrypt/decrypt the AES cipher before the real-time data transfer starts, and adopts the AES algorithm to secure the real-time data transfer. Figure 2 illustrates the information flow of the hybrid algorithm. The AES cipher is encrypted, sent to the receiver, and decrypted by using the RSA algorithm. The realtime data is encrypted/decrypted by using the AES algorithm. This hybrid algorithm more likely meets both the real-time and security requirements.
Safety risk analysis
Authorised remote users and failures in the components of Internet-based control systems can cause safety risks as well. A comprehensive safety risk analysis is required in order to identify all potential hazards and prevent them from occurring. The hazard analysis framework for computer-controlled plants proposed in our previous research 11, 12 can be extended to safety checking for Internet-based controlled plants. A Process Control Event Diagram (PCED) was used in the hazard analysis framework. A PCED is an abstract and qualitative model of the communication between process, controller and operator. The advantage of this representation is that connections between process variables and the control logic can be visualised in a very simple and descriptive manner. Due to simplicity, PCEDs can be understood by people from different engineering domains and they can provide the basis on which a HAZOP discussion can take place. Treseler et al 13 gave a formal definition of the original PCEDs. Chung and Yang 14 described the transformation from the formal description of the PCED into a symbolic model checking representation and carried out safety checking based on the symbolic model checking approach.
A modified PCED is adopted in this study for the safety risk analysis of Internet-based controlled plants. An example of a modified PCED is shown in Figure 3 . The PCED illustrates the interaction between nodes, which are arranged on six different layers (from the top to the bottom layer: Web client, Web-based user interface, Internet, Local Computer, Sensor/Actuator, Process). The nodes The set Edg = {e 1 , …, e nedg } denotes a finite set of edges. The set Act is a finite ordered set of signal processing actions given as a combination of nodes and edges. The order of actions aj in the set Act={α1, …, α nact } corresponds to the horizontal order with which the nodes involved are arranged in the PCED from left to right. In this study we follow the HAZOP principle and apply various deviations into the PCED for each action aj in order to systematically identify the potential safety risks.
Due to the nature of remote operation and Internet environment constraints, even authorised remote users may cause failures in the process without any improper operation. Therefore, we need to identify what can go wrong and consider what consequence may result. An efficient, systematic way of finding potential risks is to introduce possible deviations from the design intent, i.e. scenarios, node by node in the PCED on the basis of the use of "guidewords" which are words or phrases expressing specific types of deviation. In the conventional HAZOP the common guidewords are no, more, less, part of, and other than. Based on the UK Ministry of Defence safety checking guidance 15, three more guidewords should be used for control systems: reverse, early, late. Three Further guidewords have been added in this work: before, after, as well as. The possible attributes of control systems are data/control flow, data rate, data value, event, action, timing of event or action, repetition time, and response time. Guidewords that are applicable to Internet-based process control systems are summarised and interpreted in Table 1 . Deviation from normal behaviour of the control systems is considered for each action α j in the PCED. Causes, corresponding consequences and correcting actions can be proposed by a team of experts. Potential hazards or safety critical events can then be identified. The procedure of applying the hazard analysis will be illustrated in the following case study.
Case Study
Internet-based control system design To illustrate how well the safety and security checking procedures can be applied, an experimental water tank rig in our Internet and control laboratory at Loughborough is used as a case study. The experimental system layout is shown in Figure 4 . The control target is to maintain the liquid level of the water tank at a desired value. The tank is filled by the inlet flow controlled by a hand valve and is emptied into a drainage tank through a connection pipe and a pump. Outlet flow is controlled by a local PID controller to maintain the liquid level of the tank at a desired value. The remote controller is designed to adjust the set-point of Feature the local controller from a remote site. The DAQ instrument is used to gather the liquid level signal from and send a control command to the water tank. The remote controller is connected with the Internet through a BT broadband with the 56K bandwidth.
A block diagram of the above Internet-based control system is shown in Figure 5 . There are two controllers in the control system hierarchy. At the lower level a fast controller is implemented to control the plant at a higher frequency. The local fast controller ensures that at any situation including an Internet collapse, the plant is still under control and safe. At the higher level a slow controller is employed to remotely regulate the desirable set-point at a lower frequency in order to reduce the data transmission load and tolerate the Internet time delay. The fast controller is designed as a PID controller with the parameters Kp=5, KI=1.2, KD=0.001. The slow controller is designed as a DMC (dynamic matrix control) controller. The sampling intervals of the two controllers, Tlocal and Tremote, are chosen as 1 and 10 seconds respectively. The experimental result is illustrated in Figure 6 . The controlled liquid level can quickly follow the set-point square change. The design detail is given in our recent publication 16 . The what-if approach was mainly used for safety checking. As described earlier, because of the similarity of safety and security the what-if approach can be employed for security checking according to the possible attacking targets shown in Figure 1 . Three scenarios about the security checking are summarised in Table 2 . Various actions must be taken to avoid the consequences occurring. For example, if a malicious attacker changed the control parameters the control system will not work properly. The corresponding action is to trigger a safeguard system to stop the influence of the parameter change. The safeguard system might be designed to simply filter out the abnormal control action. Another example is that, if an abnormal process condition has been created by an attacker, the safety interlock system (SIS) will be activated to keep the process in a safer condition and wait for the intervention from a local operator.
Security checking
The what-if approach is basically a communication exercise and asks what-if questions about the systems or processes. Information is presented, discussed, analysed and recorded
Safety Checking
If replacing the process variable X with the liquid level, the process variable Y with the opening of the outlet valve, and the computation node N3 with the PID control algorithm, the PCED shown in Figure 3 then exactly describes the control logic for the water tank case study. Following the principles of HAZOP, deviations from a normal behaviour can be introduced for each action in the PCED by using the guidewords in Table 1 . For example, the deviation for the action receiving a signal from a remote site (Node N1 in Figure 3) , would fail to receive a signal from a remote site. The consequence of this deviation is that the set-point of the local PID controller is not available or a BAD value. If no measure was taken for this consequence, the local PID controller will be not able to work properly, which may lead to the liquid level of the water tank changing dramatically. Similarly, deviations for other actions in the PCED will need to be considered. Table 3 summaries deviations, corresponding causes, and consequences for the water tank shown in Figure 4 . Actions in Table 3 must be taken in order to prevent the consequences from happening. 
Conclusions
Without question, the design of Internet-based control systems is currently an important topic in the process control community. There are many opinions as to the properties such new kind of systems should possess, and the techniques that should be used to develop them. Two such properties are safety and security. This paper explored realtime data encryption and risk analysis within the safety and security domains. A hybrid algorithm is employed to ensure the security of the real-time data transfer over the Internet by combining the ASE and RSA algorithms. The safety risk analysis aims to identify the potential hazards in the system. The security risk analysis focuses on finding a way to stop malicious attacks from outside and to prevent loss as early as possible. The similarity of safety and security has been identified, which allows us to apply the risk analysis methods such as what-if methods to both of them. The security risk analysis given in this paper pointed out four possible protections to stop the malicious attacks. The detail of the security risk analysis is given in terms of the what-if method, which is mainly used for safety risk analysis. The safety risk analysis is based on our previous work for computer-controlled plants. A modified PCED is proposed for the Internet-based control systems and the actions, which must be taken in order to ensure the safety of the Internet-based control systems, are produced through the modified PCED-based HAZOP analysis. The case study illustrates the design of the Internet-based control system and the procedures of applying the security and safety checking in an experimental water tank plant. Adding a safety locking system to stop the mistake from the remote site propagating into the local control system.
